The spectre of war has lifted from the Korean peninsula as Pyongyang has embarked on nuclear disarmament and a rapprochement with the international community has begun. Advocates of nuclear non-proliferation have hailed the progress made on the North Korean nuclear crisis, and are asking whether the model used to resolve it might also be applicable to the Iranian dispute.
There are of course fundamental differences between the Iranian and North Korean disputes. Pyongyang already possesses a nuclear bomb, while Iran is still struggling to complete its uranium fuel enrichment cycle. China played a powerful mediating role in the North Korean crisis, but there is no analogous player for the Iranian situation. Then again, Iran’s economy is in a much better position than North Korea’s to withstand international pressure.
Finally, and most importantly, the country’s geostrategic situation differs greatly from that on the Korean peninsula. The West is not particularly worried about Pyongyang’s international ambitions. Inside Iran, on the other hand, there is talk on a daily basis about how the country is a superpower, and about the impending collapse of the western system. Abroad, there are allegations that Tehran is implicated in all Middle Eastern disputes.
Despite these differences, though, it is still worth asking whether the North Korean experience could be repeated with regard to the Iranian nuclear dispute. More specifically, is the kind of political flexibility demonstrated by Pyongyang evident in Tehran?
At a meeting with the speaker of the Iranian parliament, Gholam Ali Haddad-Adel, two months ago, the North Korean ambassador in Tehran Kim Chong Ryong emphasised that “Tehran and Pyongyang have been fellow combatants opposing America’s oppressive policies”. Now one of these combatants has held up a flag of truce, but the other has yet to show any sign that compromise or retreat is possible.
When President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad embarked on his second round of provincial tours in the second week of November, he reiterated in every speech he made that Iran would not back down even by one inch.
Within the last few weeks, the French, American and Russian presidents have stressed that the North Korean model could offer an appropriate model for resolving Iran’s nuclear crisis. In the North Korean case, this model included strong pressure on the leadership, constant bargaining by a six-party group, and the offer of various incentives, all of which ultimately led to Pyongyang stepping back and agreeing to dismantle its nuclear arms.
One key aspect of the situation in Iran that needs to be noted is that the principalist media – which reflect conservative viewpoints generally close to the leadership – have a quite different perspective on the North Korean model. This view stresses an American retreat and the concessions made to North Korea, rather than a climbdown by Pyongyang.
This is more than propaganda – the principalists appear to sincerely believe that the United States was ultimately forced to retreat in the face of North Korean resistance, and to make significant concessions such as security guarantees.
On the basis of this interpretation, the principalists are growing ever more certain that America will eventually yield to Iranian resistance and will grant major concessions.
This view is opposed by that section of the political elite that is critical of the government, as well as by student activists.
Dr Hermidas Bavand, a well-known expert on international affairs, is among those who argue that Tehran needs to incorporate flexibility and a willingness to negotiate into its diplomatic armoury.
Another analyst, Dr Fariborz Rais Dana, warns that “the concessions that were given to North Korea won’t be given to Iran”. According to Dana, the allegations that Iran supports terrorism are among the many factors which distinguish Tehran’s position from Pyongyang’s and which will prevent it winning the same kind of concessions.
The North Korean experience has also strengthened speculation that America’s threats of military action are merely an instrument designed to intimidate its opponents so as to extract greater concessions. The United State threatened North Korea with military action over many years, but eventually agreed to normalise relations with the communist dictatorship in February 2007, gradually lifting sanctions, extending financial and technical assistance and giving security guarantees.
A few days ago, Nobel peace laureate Shirin Ebadi gave an unprecedented speech asking for uranium enrichment in Iran to end and for Tehran to comply with United Nation’s resolutions. Ebadi announced that a new nationwide movement had been created to avert an attack on Iran, and said it would pressure the government to avoid the outbreak of war.
Such statements clearly indicate just how concerned the government’s critics are about the possibility of an attack on Iran, and show that they regard the principalist view of the crisis and its implications as unrealistic.
The critical media are currently full of reports that take the U.S. threats against Iran seriously and accuse President Ahmadinejad of excessive optimism. Even figures like Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the chairman of the Assembly of Experts, and former president Mohammad Khatami have joined in warning of the dangers.
One important lesson to be drawn from North Korea is that the acquisition of nuclear technology is not automatically followed by rapid scientific progress or economic improvements. Iranian government propaganda in recent years has suggested that creating a nuclear fuel cycle would result in substantial and immediate advancements, to be followed by positive developments in all areas from economics and agriculture to health and technology.
Under the influence of this propaganda, there are some who regard enrichment as an angel of salvation that will turn Iran into a wealthy developed country overnight.
Yet all this talk has not silenced the critics. According to Dr Saeed Mohammad Salimi, a political sciences lecturer at Tehran’s Islamic Azad University, North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear know-how did not bring it any benefits. Rather, it contributed to economic collapse, resulted in the country’s global isolation and finally forced Pyongyang to return to zero, in the sense that it had to disarm.
In short, the reformist elite does regard it as Iran’s right to develop a nuclear industry, but insists that this right should come without costs, as part of a peaceful process. The heavy price that Pyongyang paid in order to acquire the nuclear bomb has led reformers to hold up this approach as an example of how to make mistakes and create misery.
In a speech he made in Kerman recently, Abdollah Ramezanzadeh, who served as government spokesman when Mohammad Khatami was president, said, “The principalists used to say that they would turn Iran into an Islamic Japan, but Iran is now turning into an Islamic North Korea.”
This kind of remark indicates how the reformers see the Pyongyang model not merely as a bad one to follow, but as the worst possible option.
The principalists’ view of the North Korean experience differs from that of their critics more fundamentally than might be first apparent. The principalists see the outcome of the North Korean crisis and the successes of the six-party group in mediating a settlement as signs that the U.S. is about to retreat on the Iranian dispute. They believe the price Pyongyang paid was proportionate to the concessions it ultimately won. Finally, they argue that threats by the U.S. and its western allies are, as Ahmadinejad has put it, no more than “psychological warfare” and “torn-up pieces of paper”.
Opponents of this view, however, say that continuing to confront the international community would merely be to repeat the disastrous path pursued by North Korea, and that this will result either in a military attack on Iran, or in Tehran retreating at great cost to itself.
The model the reformist elite is proposing instead amounts to a return to the policy of Khatami’s government, which sought to pursue uranium enrichment via confidence-building measures. As Salimi puts it, this policy “did not regard enrichment as something sacred or as a matter of reputation, nor did it deem its suspension an unforgivable sin”.
-- Hassan Zekrgoo is a disarmament and international relation expert in Tehran. This article originally appeared in Mianeh.net
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